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SEEKING A RATIONAL LAWYER  
FOR CONSUMER CLAIMS  
AFTER THE SUPREME COURT  
DISCONNECTS CONSUMERS IN  
AT&T MOBILITY LLC V. CONCEPCION 
Ann Marie Tracey* & Shelley McGill** 
        Since Congress first enacted the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) in 
1925, arbitration agreements have become ubiquitous in consumer 
contracts. Although Congress intended for the FAA to promote 
arbitration, Congress preserved the applicability of common law and 
equitable defenses, such as unconscionability, to arbitration agreements 
through section 2 of the FAA. The California Supreme Court in 
Discover Bank v. Superior Court established parameters for finding 
unconscionability in arbitration agreements, specifically with respect to 
waivers of collective redress. In AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 
the U.S. Supreme Court, in a 5–4 decision, turned its back on 
consumers and section 2 of the FAA, holding that Congress intended to 
promote arbitration through the FAA. Therefore, the Court preempted 
any application of the Discover Bank rule to class action arbitration 
waivers. 
        This Article explores how the Court used faulty or inadequate 
analysis to reach its conclusion, failed to account for the importance of 
collective consumer redress in the modern era, and likely invalidated 
unconscionability as a defense to any arbitration agreement. Achieving 
its desired result of enforcing class arbitration waivers, the Court 
essentially eliminated one of the few methods, if not the only method, 
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that consumers have to adjudicate legitimate claims that likely could 
not or would not be brought on an individual basis. This decision 
insulates companies from any meaningful liability that may result from 
poor practices or even fraudulent schemes. After Concepcion, only 
congressional action can balance the scales between the enforceability 
of arbitration agreements and the protection of consumers through 
equitable contract defenses. Congress must act now to clarify the intent 
and scope of the FAA; this Article offers several recommendations for 
such legislation. 
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“What rational lawyer would have signed on to represent 
 the Concepcions in litigation for the possibility  
of fees stemming from a $30.22 claim?” 
—Justice Stephen Breyer1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in AT&T Mobility LLC v. 
Concepcion
2 abruptly disconnects consumers from a previously 
available forum to collectively resolve common claims through class 
arbitration. Notwithstanding the presence of a class arbitration 
waiver in a consumer contract, some preceding jurisprudence 
preserved access to collective redress when the waiver formed part of 
an adhesion contract and was harsh, oppressive, or unconscionable.3 
In a 5–4 decision authored by Justice Scalia,4 the Court held that 
section 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)5 preempts a 
California state rule allowing consumers to pursue collective 
redress.6 This decision foreclosed class arbitration not only for the 
subject parties7 but also for millions of other consumers who are 
parties to contracts of adhesion containing class arbitration waivers. 
Section 2 of the FAA provides for enforcement of arbitration 
agreements, “save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for 
the revocation of any contract.”8 California law recognized “such 
grounds” when a contract fit certain parameters of unconscionability, 
which the California Supreme Court described in Discover Bank v. 
Superior Court.9 The Ninth Circuit, in applying the Discover Bank 
rule, held that the arbitration agreement in the adhesion contract in 
Concepcion, which contained a class arbitration waiver, was 
 
 1. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1761 (2011) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting). 
 2. 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011). 
 3. See discussion infra Part II. 
 4. Justice Scalia was joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kennedy, Thomas, and 
Alito. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1743. 
 5. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2006). 
 6. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1753. 
 7. Id. 
 8. 9 U.S.C. § 2. 
 9. 113 P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2005). “[T]here is no suggestion that the quoted language in 
section 4 overrides the principle embodied in section 2 that state courts can refuse to enforce 
arbitration agreements or portions thereof based on general contract principles.” Id. at 1112. 
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unconscionable.10 The Ninth Circuit also held that, as the Discover 
Bank rule applied to contracts generally, and not just to those 
containing arbitration agreements or waivers, the FAA did not 
preempt the rule.11 
The issue before the Court in Concepcion was whether 
California law targeted contracts with arbitration clauses and thereby 
unduly interfered with section 2 of the FAA.12 In considering this 
issue, the Court was not persuaded by the argument that the rule and 
state law applied to all contracts that were unconscionable and 
concluded that the Discover Bank rule impermissibly targeted 
arbitration.13 
In so doing, the Court rejected what California deemed to be 
unconscionable contracts: those contracts where companies set out 
“to deliberately cheat large numbers of consumers out of individually 
small sums of money.”14 The Court also gave a cold shoulder to the 
Concepcions’ argument that as questions of fairness or 
unconscionability implicate “only questions of California law and no 
genuine issue under the FAA, it presents no issue for this Court to 
resolve.”15 As a result, where state laws address unconscionability 
and contract provisions, at least as they may be applied to arbitration 
agreements, Concepcion likely eviscerates them. 
The Supreme Court’s split decision in Concepcion16 reflects the 
deeply and fundamentally divided range of judicial opinions on 
consumer arbitration that exist across the United States and around 
the world.17 Led by Justice Scalia, the majority delivered a severe 
 
 10. Laster v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 584 F.3d 849, 855 (9th Cir. 2009), rev’d sub nom. 
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011). 
 11. Id. at 856–57. 
 12. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1746. For a report of the oral argument in this regard see 
Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Allows Contracts That Prohibit Class-Action Arbitration, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 27, 2011, at B3, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/28/business/ 
28bizcourt.html. 
 13. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1747–48. 
 14. Discover Bank, 113 P.3d at 1110; Liptak, supra note 12. 
 15. Brief for Respondents at 39, Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (No. 09-893) (citing Volt Info. 
Scis., Inc., v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 474 (1989)). However, 
the apparent reference in Volt was to the Court’s statement “that the interpretation of private 
contracts is ordinarily a question of state law, which this Court does not sit to review.” Volt, 489 
U.S. at 474. Contract interpretation was not at issue in Concepcion. See 131 S. Ct. at 1746. 
 16. See 131 S. Ct. at 1756 (Breyer, J., dissenting, joined by Ginsberg, Sotomayor, and 
Kagan, JJ.). 
 17. See, e.g., Seidel v. TELUS Commc’ns Inc., [2011] 1 S.C.R. 531 (Can.). This was a 5–4 
split decision with pro-arbitration policy reasoning in the dissent rather than in the majority 
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blow to consumers with monetarily small disputes. Already denied 
access to the courts, both individually and collectively, consumers 
will now be exclusively confined to individual arbitration. Class 
arbitration, the court-created solution to the class action litigation 
waiver,18 is now endangered, if not extinct, with a click of the mouse. 
It will take only seconds for businesses to amend unilaterally their 
online contracts of adhesion and remove class actions from 
existence, assuming they have not already done so. 
This Article examines the implications of the Court’s sweeping 
decision in Concepcion. In Part II, it reviews the preexisting legal 
context in which the decision occurred. Part III discusses the 
majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions delivered in 
Concepcion and contrasts their positions on the policy of arbitration 
and its application to class redress. It also examines the contrasting 
positions on the role of state law with respect to arbitration 
agreements, especially relating to the doctrine of unconscionability. 
In Part IV, this Article analyzes Concepcion in light of Discover 
Bank and the language and purposes of the FAA. This Part also 
explores the practical impact of Concepcion on business, consumers, 
and fairness. Finally, in Part V, this Article calls for legislative 
intervention to address the significant static that the Concepcion 
decision generates. 
II.  THE PREEXISTING  
LEGAL LANDSCAPE 
The Concepcion decision caps a series of recent decisions in 
which the Court addressed the sanctity of arbitration agreements and 
class arbitration.19 When the Court first considered the availability of 
class arbitration, it deferred to the arbitrator the question of scope 
 
opinion. See id.; Shelley McGill, Consumer Arbitration After Seidel v. TELUS, 51 CANADIAN 
BUS. L.J. 187, 202–03 (2011); Geneviève Saumier, Consumer Arbitration in the Evolving 
Canadian Landscape, 113 PENN ST. L. REV. 1203, 1217–21 (2009); see also Liptak, supra 
note 12 (discussing Concepcion and businesses’ use of form contracts to prohibit class 
arbitrations). 
 18. Keating v. Superior Court, 645 P.2d 1192, 1206–10 (Cal. 1982), appeal dismissed in 
part, rev’d in part on other ground sub nom. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984). 
 19. SIMPSON THACHER & BARTLETT LLP, REPORT FROM WASHINGTON: SUPREME COURT 
FINDS THE DISCOVER BANK RULE PREEMPTED BY FAA 3 (2011), available at 
http://www.stblaw.com/content/Publications/pub1196.pdf. 
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and the interpretation of the subject arbitration agreement.20 The next 
time the question was presented, the Court answered it, finding class 
arbitration unavailable: “unless parties affirmatively authorize 
[it,] . . . silence on the issue is insufficient.”21 Long before the ringing 
endorsement of contractual arbitration agreements in Concepcion, 
arbitration policy supported enforcement of contractual arbitration 
agreements.22 
Enacted in 1925, the FAA23 requires that courts enforce 
arbitration agreements according to their terms and stays any court 
action involving a dispute subject to an arbitration agreement.24 
Although the federal policy in favor of arbitration25 preempts any 
state law that purports to limit arbitration or to frustrate Congress’s 
intent,26 the FAA expressly preserves the application of common law 
and equitable defenses capable of revoking other contracts.27 The 
 
 20. Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003) (applying the subject-matter 
jurisdiction rule and requiring that an arbitrator first rule on the scope and interpretation of the 
clause, where the subject arbitration agreement did not mention class arbitration, but the chosen 
arbitrator had certified the class arbitration and awarded over $10 million in damages); see 
SIMPSON THACHER & BARTLETT LLP, supra note 19. 
 21. SIMPSON THACHER & BARTLETT LLP, supra note 19 (citing Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. 
AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010) (finding the subject-matter jurisdiction rule did 
not apply because the arbitrator had already ruled on the interpretation of the clause and the Court 
was reviewing that decision). 
 22. The policy was applied beyond the consumer context to labor and employment as well as 
franchise genres. See generally Shelley McGill & Ann Marie Tracey, Building a New Bridge over 
Troubled Waters: Lessons Learned from Canadian and U.S. Arbitration of Human Rights and 
Discrimination Employment Claims, 20 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1 (2011) (discussing the 
judicial policy favoring arbitration in labor disputes and in general). 
 23. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2006). The FAA was enacted in 1925 to overcome judicial hostility 
toward arbitration. EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 289 (2002) (blaming an English 
attitude hostile to arbitration agreements that was transported to the United States). 
 24. 9 U.S.C. §§ 3–4. 
 25. Id. §§ 1–4 (covering key provisions including the mandatory stay of court proceedings). 
The supremacy of the federal policy in favor of arbitration is attributed to Congress’s authority 
over interstate commerce; the Commerce Clause has been broadly interpreted as applying to 
intrastate commerce as long as the activity substantially affects commerce in more than one state. 
See, e.g., Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, Inc., 539 U.S. 52, 57–58 (2003) (finding that the great 
impact of commercial lending on the national economy met the Commerce Clause requirement); 
Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U. S. 265, 275–77 (1995); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 
U.S. 111, 124 (1942); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824). 
 26. Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 477–
78 (1989); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 489 (1987); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 
10–16 (1984) (ruling in the context of a dispute between franchisees and the franchisor). 
 27. 9 U.S.C. § 2 provides that an arbitration clause “shall be valid, irrevocable, and 
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any 
contract.” 9 U.S.C. § 2; Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687–88 (1996) 
(specifically naming unconscionability); Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Servs. Inc., 498 F.3d 
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continued availability of such defenses as offered under state law, 
specifically unconscionability, was at the foundation of the questions 
addressed in Concepcion. 
Courts in California28 and other states29 embraced 
unconscionability as one of the traditional contract law defenses that 
could render unenforceable a harsh or oppressive arbitration clause 
contained in a consumer contract of adhesion. California has been a 
leader among states that limit the enforcement of unconscionable 
consumer arbitration clauses.30 Various other courts across the 
United States, both state and federal, have also held that 
 
976, 981 (9th Cir. 2007); Gen. Constr. Co. v. Castro, 401 F.3d 963, 975 (9th Cir. 2005) (finding 
that the FAA does not preempt California law); Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., 
Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 679 (Cal. 2000). 
 28. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1670.5(a) (West 2011); see, e.g., Shroyer, 498 F.3d 976; Ingle v. 
Circuit City Stores, Inc., 328 F.3d 1165 (9th Cir. 2003); Ting v. AT&T, 182 F. Supp. 2d 902 
(N.D. Cal. 2002), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 319 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2003); Comb v. PayPal, 
Inc., 218 F. Supp. 2d 1165 (N.D. Cal. 2002); Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100 
(Cal. 2005); Klussman v. Cross Country Bank, 36 Cal. Rptr. 3d 728 (Ct. App. 2005); Aral v. 
Earthlink, Inc., 36 Cal. Rptr. 3d 229 (Ct. App. 2005); Parrish v. Cingular Wireless, LLC, No. 
A105518, 2005 WL 2420719 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 2, 2005); Mandel v. Household Bank (Nev.), 
Nat’l Ass’n, 129 Cal. Rptr. 2d 380 (Ct. App. 2003); Shea v. Household Bank (SB), Nat’l Ass’n, 
129 Cal. Rptr. 2d 387 (Ct. App. 2003); Szetela v. Discover Bank, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 862 (Ct. App. 
2002); Badie v. Bank of Am., 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 273 (Ct. App. 1998). 
 29. See, e.g., Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25 (1st Cir. 2006); Kinkel v. Cingular 
Wireless LLC, 857 N.E.2d 250 (Ill. 2006); Posadas v. Pool Depot, Inc., 858 So. 2d 611, 614 (La. 
Ct. App. 2003); Sutton’s Steel & Supply, Inc. v. BellSouth Mobility, Inc., 776 So. 2d 589 (La. Ct. 
App. 2000); Fiser v. Dell Computer Corp., 188 P.3d 1215, 1218, 1222 (N.M. 2008); Tillman v. 
Commercial Credit Loans, Inc., 655 S.E.2d 362, 372–74 (N.C. 2008); Scott v. Cingular Wireless, 
161 P.3d 1000 (Wash. 2007); Coady v. Cross Country Bank, Inc., 729 N.W.2d 732 (Wis. Ct. 
App. 2007). 
 30. See cases and statute cited supra note 28; see also Alan S. Kaplinsky & Mark J. Levin, 
The Gold Rush of 2002: California Courts Lure Plaintiffs’ Lawyers (But Undermine Federal 
Arbitration Act) by Refusing to Enforce “No-Class Action” Clauses in Consumer Arbitration 
Agreements, 58 BUS. LAW 1289 (2003) (contending that the California courts’ decisions in 
Szetela, ACORN v. Household International, Inc., and Ting are fundamentally flawed for 
protecting social policies favoring class actions that are preempted under the FAA). Not all states 
consider consumer arbitration clauses with class action waivers unconscionable. For example, 
Texas and Delaware tend to enforce them. Among federal courts, before Concepcion the Ninth 
Circuit was much more likely to enforce such clauses than the Seventh Circuit was. See Iberia 
Credit Bureau, Inc. v. Cingular Wireless LLC, 379 F.3d 159, 174 (5th Cir. 2004) (upholding the 
Cingular Wireless and Sprint arbitration clauses while finding the Centennial clause 
unconscionable; Louisiana’s generally reduced availability of consumer class actions was a key 
factor here); Carbajal v. H & R Block Tax Servs., Inc., 372 F.3d 903, 906 (7th Cir. 2004); 
Livingston v. Assocs. Fin., Inc., 339 F.3d 553 (7th Cir. 2003); Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 
F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997); Hubbert v. Dell Corp., 835 N.E.2d 113 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005); Stenzel v. 
Dell, Inc., 870 A.2d 133 (Me. 2005); Walther v. Sovereign Bank, 872 A.2d 735 (Md. 2005). 
 
Winter 2012]       SEEKING A RATIONAL LAWYER 443 
unconscionability survived FAA preemption,31 even while they have 
disagreed over whether any given clause was in fact 
unconscionable.32 
Defining unconscionability is a matter of state law,33 and 
although definitions vary depending on the state, most involve some 
combination of procedural and substantive unconscionability.34 
However, the U.S. Supreme Court has long been skeptical about the 
application of unconscionability to the arbitration context,35 fearing 
 
 31. Doctor’s Assocs., 517 U.S. at 686–87 (expressly preserving unconscionability as an 
available ground to invalidate an arbitration clause); see, e.g., cases and statutes cited supra notes 
27–29. 
 32. See, e.g., Hubbert v. Dell Corp., 835 N.E.2d 113 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (applying Texas 
law and compelling arbitration). But see Fiser v. Dell Computer Corp., 188 P.3d 1215 (N.M. 
2008) (refusing to apply Texas law and declining to apply an arbitration provision because its 
unconscionable class action ban was not severable). See generally Iberia Credit Bureau, 379 F.3d 
at 174–75 (finding that one clause was unconscionable and the other two were not); Blaz v. 
Belfer, 368 F.3d 501, 504–05 (5th Cir. 2004); Livingston, 339 F.3d at 557; Snowden v. 
CheckPoint Check Cashing, 290 F.3d 631, 638 (4th Cir. 2002); Burden v. Check Into Cash of Ky. 
LLC, 267 F.3d 483, 492–93 (6th Cir. 2001); Randolph v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 244 F.3d 814, 
818 (11th Cir. 2001); Johnson v. W. Suburban Bank, 225 F.3d 366, 369, 373–74 (3d Cir. 2000). 
 33. Doctor’s Assocs., 517 U.S. at 686 (citing Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 
U.S. 265, 281 (1995)). 
 34. The definition of unconscionability in California requires both procedural and 
substantive unconscionability in the form of a sliding scale. The more substantively 
unconscionable a term is, the less procedurally unconscionable it needs to be, and vice versa. See 
Laster v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 584 F.3d 849, 853 (9th Cir. 2009), rev’d sub nom. AT&T 
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011); Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare 
Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 690 (Cal. 2000); Szetela v. Discover Bank, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 862, 866 
(Ct. App. 2002); Stirlen v. Supercuts, Inc., 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 138, 144–45 (Ct. App. 1997). For 
Texas law, see Provencher v. Dell, Inc., 409 F. Supp. 2d 1196 (C.D. Cal. 2006), and AutoNation 
USA Corp. v. Leroy, 105 S.W.3d 190 (Tex. App. 2003). For Wisconsin law, see Wisconsin Auto 
Title Loans, Inc., v. Jones, 714 N.W.2d 155 (Wis. 2006); Deminsky v. Arlington Plastics 
Machinery, 657 N.W.2d 411 (Wis. 2003); and Discount Fabric House of Racine, Inc., v. 
Wisconsin Telephone Co., 345 N.W.2d 417, 424 (Wis. 1984). For Montana law, see Ticknor v. 
Choice Hotels International, Inc., 265 F.3d 931 (9th Cir. 2001). For Louisiana law see Ronald L. 
Hersbergen, Unconscionability: The Approach of the Louisiana Civil Code, 43 LA. L. REV. 1315 
(1983). 
 35. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001) (ruling in the context of an 
employment relationship); Doctor’s Assocs., 517 U.S. 687; Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 489 
(1987); Southland v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10–16 (1984) (ruling in the context of a dispute 
between franchisees and the franchisor). The same arguments relating to the unconscionability of 
contracts of adhesion are advanced by consumers, employees, and franchisees, as they are 
typically large in number, in a position of unequal bargaining power, and unable to negotiate any 
change in terms. The same legislative protection has been proposed for all three groups. See, e.g., 
Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, H.R. 1020, 111th Cong. (2009); Arbitration Fairness Act of 
2007, H.R. 3010, 110th Cong. (2007); S. 1782, 110th Cong. (2007); Consumer Fairness Act of 
2007, H.R. 1433, 110th Cong. (2007). The 2011 configuration drops franchise agreements in 
place of civil rights disputes. Arbitration Fairness Act of 2011, H.R. 1873, 112th Cong. (2011); S. 
987, 112th Cong. (2011). 
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that unconscionability was a device employed to undermine the 
policy in favor of arbitration.36 
Typically, consumer arbitration clauses are buried within the 
standard form contract presented to the consumer on “a take it or 
leave it” basis at the time of purchase. Sometimes, they are even 
added after the purchase under the authority of a unilateral 
amendment clause.37 In either event, few would suggest that the 
consumer was aware of the clause, had input into its provisions, or 
could have changed it if he or she had tried.38 In this context, it is not 
difficult for courts to find procedural unconscionability arising from 
the unequal bargaining power between the business and the 
consumer.39 
Substantive unconscionability, unlike procedural 
unconscionability, involves a finding that the result, outcome, or 
application of a particular clause is overly harsh or unfair to the 
weaker party,40 and, in this context, California courts have identified 
particular features that make some arbitration clauses and class 
action waivers overly harsh or so unfair as to be substantively 
unconscionable.41 
Arbitration as a forum for a particular type of dispute cannot be 
considered inherently unfair or harsh without obviously violating the 
 
 36. “The cry of ‘unconscionable!’ just repackages the tired assertion that arbitration should 
be disparaged as second-class adjudication. It is precisely to still such cries that the Federal 
Arbitration Act equates arbitration with other contractual terms.” Carbajal v. H & R Block Tax 
Servs. Inc., 372 F.3d 903, 906 (7th Cir. 2004). But see Ramona L. Lampley, Is Arbitration Under 
Attack?: Exploring the Recent Judicial Skepticism of the Class Arbitration Waiver and Innovative 
Solutions to the Unsettled Legal Landscape, 18 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 477, 490–91 (2008) 
(discussing pre-Concepcion judicial treatment of class arbitration waivers). 
 37. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1744–46 (2011); Iberia Credit 
Bureau, 379 F.3d at 163–64, 173–74 (5th Cir. 2004) (finding the use of an amendment clause to 
add an arbitration clause was not sufficient on its own to render the arbitration agreement 
unconscionable). 
 38. The basic characteristics of any contract of adhesion are a standardized contract, which is 
drafted and imposed by the party of superior bargaining strength and gives the weaker party only 
the choice of agreeing or rejecting it. ACORN v. Household Int’l, Inc., 211 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 
1168 (N.D. Cal. 2002). Adhesion contracts are not per se invalid but are suspect. Wis. Auto Title 
Loans, 714 N.W.2d at 170–71. 
 39. See, e.g., Szetela v. Discover Bank, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 862, 867 (Ct. App. 2002) (finding 
made in one paragraph); 24 Hour Fitness, Inc., v. Superior Court, 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d 553, 541 (Ct. 
App. 1998); Wis. Auto Title Loans, 714 N.W.2d at 167–71 (upholding the lower court’s finding of 
procedural unconscionability without holding an evidentiary hearing). 
 40. See Blake v. Ecker, 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 422, 433 (Ct. App. 2001); Wis. Auto Title Loans, 
714 N.W.2d at 171. 
 41. See supra notes 26–31, 33, and accompanying text. 
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FAA.42 Merely denying consumers access to a judicial forum is not 
unfair when an alternate forum of arbitration remains available; 
however, denying consumers access to any forum is substantively 
unconscionable.43 California courts have focused on specific aspects 
of the contractual arbitration procedures that appeared to discourage 
or prohibit a consumer from advancing a claim through arbitration 
and therefore contributed to a clause’s unfairness because some 
procedural features effectively prevented a consumer from pursuing 
a claim at all.44 Suspect features have included high consumer cost 
responsibility,45 shortened limitation periods, limited discovery rights 
or remedies,46 lack of mutuality,47 and waiver of class proceedings. 
 
 42. See, e.g., Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 353–54 (2008) (dealing with attorney fees 
governed by the California Talent Agencies Act purporting to vest exclusive jurisdiction in the 
Labor Commissioner and applying the subject-matter jurisdiction rule to send a matter to an 
arbitrator); Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 123–24 (2001) (finding that the 
FAA applied to employment disputes because to find otherwise would undermine “the FAA’s 
proarbitration purposes”); Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 89–90 (2000); 
Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226–27 (1987) (demonstrating that, 
absent congressional intent, arbitration agreements will be upheld even in the face of statutory 
administrative schemes to enforce the particular statutory claims). 
 43. See, e.g., Tillman v. Commercial Credit Loans, Inc., 655 S.E.2d 362, 372 (N.C. 2008) 
(“Evidence in the record indicates that no arbitrations have been brought under the clause that 
defendant has included in over 68,000 loan agreements in North Carolina. Based on this evidence 
and the above analysis, it appears that the combination of the loser pays provision, the de novo 
appeal process, and the prohibition on joinder of claims and class actions creates a barrier to 
pursuing arbitration that is substantially greater than that present in the context of litigation. We 
agree with the trial court that ‘[d]efendant's arbitration clause contains features which would deter 
many consumers from seeking to vindicate their rights.’”). 
 44. See, e.g., Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 279 F.3d 889, 893–94 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(focusing on provisions that limited relief to employees, imposed arbitration costs on an 
employee, and imposed a strict statute of limitations when applying California law). 
 45. Id. at 894; Delta Funding Corp. v. Harris, 912 A.2d 104, 112–13 (N.J. 2006); Vasquez-
Lopez v. Beneficial Or., Inc., 152 P.3d 940, 949–54 (Or. Ct. App. 2007) (considering cost 
sharing, class action waiver, and mutuality). California codified cost protection for consumers. 
See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1284.3 (West 2007). International consumer protection policies also 
insulate consumers from the cost consequences of alternative dispute resolution. See ORG. FOR 
ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., RECOMMENDATION OF THE OECD COUNCIL CONCERNING 
GUIDELINES FOR CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE CONTEXT OF ELECTRONIC COMMERCE 7–8 
(1999), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/18/13/34023235.pdf; see also Morrison v. 
Circuit City Stores, Inc., 317 F.3d 646, 658–59 (6th Cir. 2003) (requiring fairness of cost splitting 
provisions in an employment arbitration agreement to be determined on a case-by-case basis); 
Burden v. Check Into Cash of Ky., LLC, 267 F.3d 483, 492 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding that the party 
alleging burdensome costs has the burden of proof). 
 46. Anderson v. Comcast Corp., 500 F.3d 66, 75–77 (1st Cir. 2007) (severing the arbitration 
agreement’s one-year limitation period and allowing arbitration to proceed under the four-year 
statutory limitation period); Adams, 279 F.3d at 894–95 (considering reduced remedies, as well as 
a shortened limitation period, decided in the employment rather than in the consumer context). 
 47. Wis. Auto Title Loans, Inc., v. Jones, 714 N.W.2d 155, 173–74 (Wis. 2006) 
(determining that lack of mutuality was the sole feature supporting substantive unconscionability 
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Often, the presence of one of these features alone has not been 
enough to render an arbitration agreement unconscionable, but the 
collective impact of multiple features in the same clause has met the 
test.48 
Class action waivers have been the exception. A contractual 
term that waives class proceedings has been one feature that 
California courts previously found individually harsh enough to 
render an otherwise acceptable arbitration clause unconscionable.49 
Courts first expressed concern in the context of judicial class action 
waivers. California courts recognized that some disputes were too 
small to warrant individual processing in any forum. For small 
disputes to remain viable, consumers needed collective redress.50 
 
and holding that “[t]he doctrine of substantive unconscionability limits the extent to which a 
stronger party to a contract may impose arbitration on the weaker party without accepting the 
arbitration forum for itself”); see Iberia Credit Bureau, Inc. v. Cingular Wireless LLC, 379 F.3d 
159 (5th Cir. 2004) (finding unconscionability in the lack of mutuality of Centennial’s clause, 
while compelling arbitration under the Cingular Wireless mutually applicable arbitration clause); 
Ticknor v. Choice Hotels Int’l, Inc., 265 F.3d 931 (9th Cir. 2001) (applying Montana law); E-Z 
Cash Advance, Inc. v. Harris, 60 S.W.3d 436, 441 (Ark. 2001); Armendariz v. Found. Health 
Psychare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 745 (Cal. 2000) (requiring a modicum of bilateralism); Flores 
v. Transamerica Home First, Inc., 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 376 (Ct. App. 2001); Palm Beach Motor Cars 
Ltd., Inc. v. Jeffries, 885 So. 2d 990, 992 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004); Williams v. Aetna Fin. Co., 
700 N.E.2d 859, 866 (Ohio 1998); Arnold v. United Cos. Lending Corp., 511 S.E.2d 854, 861–62 
(W. Va. 1998); Shelley McGill, Consumer Arbitration Clause Enforcement: A Balanced 
Legislative Response, 47 AM. BUS. L.J. 361, 381, nn.108–09 (2010). 
 48. Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25, 53–61 (1st Cir. 2006); Ting v. AT&T Mobility, 
319 F.3d 1126, 1149–50 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding the cumulative impact of the cost sharing 
provision, confidentiality, and class action waiver unconscionable); Adkins v. Labor Ready, Inc., 
303 F.3d 496, 503 (4th Cir. 2002) (finding that a single feature is not sufficient to render an 
agreement unconscionable); Luna v. Household Fin. Corp. III, 236 F. Supp. 2d 1166, 1180–83 
(W.D. Wash. 2002); Tillman v. Commercial Credit Loans, Inc., 655 S.E.2d 362, 372–74 (N.C. 
2008); Vasquez-Lopez, 152 P.3d at 949–51. 
 49. See, e.g., Szetela v. Discover Bank, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 862, 867 (Ct. App. 2002) (“The 
manifest one-sidedness of the no class action provision at issue here is blindingly obvious.”) This 
position did not always sit well with higher courts. The general availability of class actions in the 
particular state is a factor when deciding the importance of waiving it. See Iberia Credit Bureau, 
379 F.3d at 174–75 (upholding a waiver because consumers in Louisiana have limited class 
action rights in any event). 
 50. The court noted in Szetela: 
This provision is clearly meant to prevent customers, such as Szetela and those he 
seeks to represent, from seeking redress for relatively small amounts of money, such as 
the $29 sought by Szetela. Fully aware that few customers will go to the time and 
trouble of suing in small claims court, Discover has instead sought to create for itself 
virtual immunity from class or representative actions despite their potential merit, 
while suffering no similar detriment to its own rights. 
118 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 867 (lamenting loss of forum, loss of collectivity, and lack of mutuality).The 
Seventh Circuit expressed a similar sentiment in Carnegie v. Household International Inc., 376 
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As a result, courts considered waivers unconscionable when 
businesses required consumers in California to give up their rights to 
participate in judicial class actions in favor of individual arbitration 
only.51 Out of respect for arbitration policy, courts severed waivers 
from the rest of their respective arbitration clauses and allowed 
disputes to proceed to arbitration in a collective form—class 
arbitration was born.52 Other times, the entire arbitration clause 
failed.53 Some (but not all) states have followed suit.54 The Illinois 
Supreme Court, after surveying various state court decisions, 
concluded that generally, if the plaintiff had a “meaningful 
opportunity to reject” the class action waiver or if the plaintiff 
otherwise had a cost-effective opportunity to seek a remedy, the 
waiver was not unconscionable.55 
Even as California courts have found class arbitration available 
as a means of saving an arbitration clause,56 other courts have found 
that when a consumer agreement was silent on class claims, the 
choice of arbitration meant choosing only individual arbitration and 
did not include collective redress.57 When this issue first made its 
way to the nation’s highest court, the Supreme Court deferred the 
interpretation of the scope of the arbitration clause to the arbitrator 
 
F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2004) (“The realistic alternative to a class action is not 17 million 
individual suits, but zero individual suits, as only a lunatic or a fanatic sues for $30.”). 
 51. See, e.g., Ting, 319 F.3d at 1149–50; Comb v. PayPal, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1175–
76 (N.D. Cal. 2002); ACORN v. Household Int’l, Inc., 211 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1170–71 (N.D. Cal. 
2002). 
 52. Anderson v. Comcast Corp., 500 F.2d 66, 71–72 (1st Cir. 2007); Kristian, 446 F.3d at 
48; Blue Cross v. Superior Court, 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d 779, 794 (Ct. App. 1998) (holding that, absent 
an express class arbitration waiver, parties may be ordered to class arbitration under state law); 
Dickler v. Shearson Lehmab, 596 A.2d 860, 867 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991). 
 53. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 279 F.3d 889, 896 (9th Cir. 2002); Armendariz v. 
Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 697–99 (Cal. 2000) (finding that severance 
would amount to redrafting so the arbitration clause failed in its entirety). 
 54. Anderson, 500 F.3d at 77 (holding that severance was applicable); Kristian, 446 F.3d at 
55; Dickler, 596 A.2d at 866. 
 55. Mark M. Leitner & Joseph S. Goode, Class Action Prohibitions and the Effect of 
Contract Rules on the Collective Pursuit of Common Claims, 30 FRANCHISE L.J. 166, 168 (2011) 
(citing Kinkel v. Cingular Wireless LLC, 857 N.E.2d 250, 274 (Ill. 2006)); see Terry F. Moritz & 
Brandon J. Fitch, The Future of Consumer Arbitration in Light of Stolt-Nielsen, 23 LOY. 
CONSUMER L. REV. 265, 277–80 (2011) (discussing class arbitration waivers in light of state 
law). 
 56. Keating v. Superior Court, 645 P.2d 1192, 1206–10 (Cal. 1982); Blue Cross, 78 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d at 793. 
 57. See, e.g., Johnson v. W. Suburban Bank, 225 F.3d 366, 369 (3d Cir. 2000); Iowa Grain 
Co. v. Brown, 171 F.3d 504, 510 (7th Cir. 1999); Champ v. Siegel Trading Co., Inc., 55 F.3d 269, 
274–77 (7th Cir. 1995). 
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under the subject-matter jurisdiction rule.58 Thereafter, some 
arbitrators interpreted arbitration clauses to include class arbitration 
where the agreements were silent.59 Businesses moved quickly to 
block the possibility of collective redress in any forum, judicial or 
arbitral. In addition to adapting existing online arbitration clauses to 
expressly waive class-wide arbitration and specify individual 
arbitration only, businesses took advantage of the varying positions 
on unconscionability with choice-of-law provisions that targeted 
states most likely to reject the unconscionability defense.60 
California legislation provides that a court may refuse to enforce 
a contract if it finds as a matter of law that the contract or a clause is 
“unconscionable at the time it was made.”61 In addition to allowing a 
court to “enforce the remainder of the contract without the 
unconscionable clause,” California Civil Code section 1670.5(a) 
provides, in the same sentence, that a court “may so limit the 
 
 58. Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 449 (2006); Green Tree Fin. 
Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 453 (2003); Jonathan R. Bunch, Note, To Be Announced: Silence 
from the United States Supreme Court and Disagreement Among Lower Courts Suggest an 
Uncertain Future for Class-Wide Arbitration, 2004 J. DISP. RESOL. 259 (2004). When answering 
the question in the business-to-business context, the Supreme Court confined the choice of 
arbitration to individual arbitration when the contract did not explicitly waive class arbitration. 
See Stolt-Nielsen, S.A. v. Animal Feeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1775 (2010). 
 59. See Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1780–81 (2010). 
 60. Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2005) (holding that the 
application of Delaware’s choice of law provision yielded a different result than when California 
law was applied), remanded to 36 Cal. Rptr. 3d 456 (Ct. App.); see also Ticknor v. Choice Hotels 
Int’l, Inc., 265 F.3d 931, 937–41 (9th Cir. 2001) (applying Montana’s choice of law clause); Fiser 
v. Dell Computer Corp., 188 P.3d 1215, 1218, 1222 (N.M. 2008) (refusing to apply Texas’s 
choice of law provision because it would require enforcement of a class action ban in violation of 
New Mexico public policy). 
 61. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1670.5(a) (West 2011) provides: 
(a) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the contract to 
have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse to enforce the 
contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable 
clause, or it may so limit the application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any 
unconscionable result. 
Section (b) allows the parties an evidentiary hearing on this issue. This phraseology would 
provide support for Justice Thomas’s concurrence, which would require any court action to be 
founded upon unconscionability at the time of the contract formation. AT&T Mobility LLC v. 
Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011) (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing 9 U.S.C. §§ 2, 4 
(2006)) (“As I would read it, the FAA requires that an agreement to arbitrate be enforced unless a 
party successfully challenges the formation of the arbitration agreement, such as by proving fraud 
or duress.”). Justice Thomas noted that “a district court cannot follow both the FAA and the 
Discover Bank rule, which does not relate to defects in the making of an agreement.” Id. 
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application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any 
unconscionable result.”62 
The California Supreme Court’s 2005 decision in Discover 
Bank
63 established three parameters for satisfying a finding of 
unconscionability with respect to waivers of collective redress.64 
First, disputes would “predictably involve small amounts of 
damages.”65 Second, one party must hold a superior bargaining 
position, and third, there must be an allegation that the stronger party 
“has carried out a scheme to deliberately cheat large numbers of 
consumers.”66 If these three conditions are present, the waiver should 
be construed as exculpatory of the stronger party’s liability for fraud 
and should be found unconscionable. This analysis became known as 
the Discover Bank rule and was applied to determine the 
unconscionability of judicial and arbitral class proceedings waivers.67 
If an unconscionable class arbitration waiver was capable of being 
severed from an arbitration clause, the disputes were allowed to 
proceed to class arbitration. 
Generally in this regard, consumer arbitration cases fall into two 
categories: the first category involves arbitration clauses that make 
no mention (waiver or authorization) of class proceedings. Cases in 
the second category involve clauses that expressly prohibit judicial 
and/or arbitral class proceedings. In the first category, the resulting 
question is whether the choice of arbitration implicitly includes class 
arbitration. Although not in the consumer context, the U.S. Supreme 
Court answered this question in 2010. In Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. 
AnimalFeeds International Corp,68 the Court held that class 
arbitration is not implicit when an agreement to arbitrate does not 
 
 62. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1670.5(a). 
 63. Discover Bank, 113 P.3d at 1110; see Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Servs., Inc., 
498 F.3d 976, 983 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 64. See, e.g., Parrish v. Cingular Wireless, LLC, 28 Cal. Rptr. 3d 802 (Ct. App. 2005) 
(finding—before the Discover Bank rule was articulated—that the waiver was not unduly harsh), 
transferred to No. A105518, 2005 WL 2420719 (Cal. Ct. App.) (reconsidering and finding the 
clause unconscionable under the Discover Bank rule), cert. denied sub nom. Cingular Wireless v. 
Mendoza, 547 U.S. 1188 (2006). 
 65. Discover Bank, 113 P.3d at 1110. 
 66. Id. 
 67. See, e.g., Shroyer, 498 F.3d at 983–86; Klussman v. Cross Country Bank, 36 Cal. Rptr. 
3d 728, 738–39 (Ct. App. 2005); Aral v. EarthLink, Inc., 36 Cal. Rptr. 3d 229, 238 (Ct. App. 
2005). 
 68. 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010). 
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mention it.69 Agreement to submit to class arbitration must be found 
in the intention of the parties,70 suggesting that the differences 
between individual and collective arbitration are too great to impose 
on parties without their agreement. It seems likely that Stolt-Nielsen 
will apply to the consumer context as well. 
The Supreme Court had not considered the second category of 
consumer cases, those relating to class proceedings waivers, and the 
corresponding unconscionability question until Concepcion. In this 
second category, two questions arise with respect to inclusion of a 
class arbitration waiver. Does the loss of collectability alone or in 
conjunction with other one-sided features render a clause so unfair as 
to be unconscionable? If so, will severing an unconscionable waiver 
from an arbitration clause, thereby allowing class arbitration to 
proceed, violate a basic tenet of arbitration and the FAA by 
redesigning the process71 for the parties? The severance question 
seems to be answered by Stolt-Nielsen; having demonstrated an 
intention to restrict class arbitration, it is unlikely to be implied into 
any redacted clause, as it would amount to redesigning the process 
for the parties. The remaining question relating to the application of 
the unconscionability doctrine to class arbitration waivers was placed 
before the Supreme Court in Concepcion. 
III.  AT&T MOBILITY LLC  
V. CONCEPCION 
Class action and arbitration issues have been at the forefront of 
the Supreme Court’s docket of late.72 Prominent among these cases 
was AT&T Mobility, Inc. v. Concepcion, where the Court tackled 
consumer class arbitration waivers in light of state law and the 
 
 69. Id. at 1775. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 57 (1995) (holding that 
parties may “structure their arbitration agreements as they see fit” (quoting Volt Info. Scis., Inc. 
v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 479 (1989))). 
 72. See, e.g., Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1776 (holding a class action waiver must be 
contained within the language of the arbitration agreement); Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 
130 S. Ct. 2772, 2779 (2010) (upholding a determination that a delegation provision in an 
arbitration agreement was itself an agreement to arbitration and was enforceable as severable); 14 
Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456, 1474 (2009) (holding that a litigation waiver in a 
collective bargaining agreement precluded an individual union member from bringing a statutory 
discrimination claim in court). 
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FAA.73 Rather than restricting itself to the questions before it—that 
is, the applicability of unconscionability and whether the Discover 
Bank rule impermissibly targeted arbitration—the Court primarily 
used the opportunity to criticize class arbitration’s ability to function 
as an effective tool for resolving common disputes and to promote 
the goals of individual arbitration.74 
A.  Background 
A disputed sales-tax charge of $30.22 for a “free phone” and the 
application of the Discover Bank rule were at the heart of the dispute 
in Concepcion.75 Vincent and Liza Concepcion purchased a cellular 
telephone service through AT&T Mobility LLC (“AT&T”) in 2002; 
the service had been advertised as coming with a “free phone” as part 
of the agreement.76 As subsequently amended in 2006, the contract 
required that all disputes between the Concepcions, as consumers, 
and AT&T be brought in small claims court or be resolved in 
arbitration.77 It also mandated that a consumer bring any claim in his 
or her “individual capacity, and not as a plaintiff or class member in 
any purported class or representative proceeding.”78 At the same 
time, the contract change contained some provisions quite favorable 
to customers.79 
The Concepcions filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the 
Southern District of California; their claim was consolidated with a 
putative class action alleging fraud and false advertising by AT&T80 
AT&T moved to compel arbitration, which the district court denied 
after applying the Discover Bank rule.81 The court reasoned that, 
 
 73. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1744 (2011). 
 74. Id. at 1746–53. 
 75. Id. at 1744. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. The contract also allowed unilateral amendments by AT&T, which did subsequently 
amend the contract, including adding the arbitration process at issue in this case. Id. 
 79. See id. These included a simple process for initiating claims, an ability of the consumer 
to invoke arbitration if AT&T did not settle within thirty days, AT&T bearing the cost of 
arbitration for any nonfrivolous claims, a convenient forum for the customer, and broad arbitrator 
discretion in terms of a remedy. Id. Most notably, if the arbitration award exceeded the last 
written AT&T settlement offer, the company was required to pay at least a $7,500 recovery as 
well as twice the amount of the attorney’s fees the customer incurred. Id.; see SIMPSON THACHER 
& BARTLETT LLP, supra note 19, at 1 (dubbing these provisions of AT&T’s contract with the 
Concepcions “pro-consumer”). 
 80. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1744. 
 81. Id. at 1744–45. 
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although the arbitration agreement had many favorable aspects and 
even contained monetary incentives for the consumer to use 
arbitration, “AT&T had not shown that bilateral arbitration 
adequately substituted for the deterrent effects of class actions.”82 
The Ninth Circuit affirmed, also applying the Discover Bank rule and 
finding the arbitration agreement unconscionable under California 
law.83 The appellate court further “held that the Discover Bank rule 
was not preempted by the FAA because that rule was simply ‘a 
refinement of the unconscionability analysis applicable to all 
contracts generally in California.’”84 
B.  The Decision 
To say that the Justices’ opinions in the Concepcion decision 
were divided is an understatement; the concurrence was given 
reluctantly and was based on entirely different reasoning than that on 
which the Court’s majority opinion was based,85 and the four 
dissenting judges delivered a strong minority opinion by speaking in 
a single, unified voice.86 The three opinions reflect disparate views 
on three fundamental issues: (1) the purpose and objectives of the 
FAA; (2) the availability and application of the unconscionability 
defense; and (3) the importance of class arbitration in consumer 
redress. 
1.  The Majority  
Opinion  
The Supreme Court framed the issue before it as whether the 
Discover Bank rule categorized “most collective-arbitration waivers 
in consumer contracts as unconscionable”87 and therefore 
unenforceable,88 in violation of the FAA requirement that arbitration 
 
 82. Id. at 1745 (citing Laster v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. 05CV1167, 2008 WL 5216255, at 
*14 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2008), aff’d sub nom. Laster v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 584 F.3d 849 (9th 
Cir. 2009), rev’d sub nom. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011)). 
 83. Id. (quoting Laster, 584 F.3d at 855). 
 84. Id. (citing Laster, 584 F.3d at 857). 
 85. Id. at 1753–56 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 86. Id. at 1756–62 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 87. Id. at 1746 (majority opinion). 
 88. Id. 
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agreements be enforced.89 The Court then set the stage for its 
ultimate conclusion that the FAA preempted California law in this 
regard, trumpeting the themes of the sanctity of arbitration when it is 
contractually agreed on and the benefits it offers. 
The Court took great pains to educate its audience on the 
background of the FAA and the Court’s role in counteracting 
“judicial hostility to arbitration agreements.”90 The FAA’s central 
feature, section 2, provides for the validity, irrevocability, and 
enforceability of contractually agreed-upon arbitration, “save upon 
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any 
contract.”91 However, the Court underscored the statute’s 
“fundamental principle that arbitration is a matter of contract”92 and 
declared that it “was designed to promote arbitration.”93 This, 
combined with a “liberal federal policy favoring arbitration,”94 
required courts to “enforce [the arbitration agreements] according to 
their terms.”95 The resulting position of the Court was that if class 
arbitration conflicts with the goals of arbitration, it is therefore 
inconsistent with the FAA.96 
In the face of the declared sanctity of arbitration goals and 
agreements, the question then was whether the Discover Bank rule 
and criteria for preserving class arbitration, when the arbitration 
agreement expressly prohibited it, fell within the FAA exemption 
from enforceability on legal or equitable grounds.97 The Court noted 
that under the Discover Bank rule, procedural and substantive 
“elements” are essential to an unconscionability finding.98 The 
procedural aspect focuses on oppression resulting from unequal 
bargaining power, while the substantive element examines “overly 
 
 89. Id. at 1744. The Court introduced the central question as whether section 2 of the FAA 
“prohibits States from conditioning the enforceability of certain arbitration agreements on the 
availability of classwide arbitration procedures.” Id. 
 90. Id. at 1745. 
 91. Id. (citing 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006)). 
 92. Id. (citing Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2776 (2010)). 
 93. Id. at 1749. 
 94. Id. at 1745 (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 
24 (1983)). 
 95. Id. at 1745–46 (citing Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior 
Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 478 (1989)). 
 96. See id. at 1746. 
 97. See id. 
 98. Id. 
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harsh,” surprising, or “one-sided” results.99 In this vein the Discover 
Bank court described circumstances where a class action arbitration 
waiver would be unconscionable: when there is an adhesion contract, 
when the amount in controversy is small, and when “the party with 
the superior bargaining power has carried out a scheme to 
deliberately cheat large numbers of consumers out of individually 
small sums of money.”100 
Rather than focusing on whether the contract in question met the 
Discover Bank parameters of unconscionability or whether the 
criteria themselves constituted “grounds as exist at law or in equity 
for the revocation of any contract”101 under the FAA exemption, the 
Court reverted to assessing the Discover Bank rule based on the 
outcome or disparate impact of the rule’s application. If after 
applying the Discover Bank rule courts find most collective 
arbitration waivers in consumer contracts unconscionable102 and 
therefore unenforceable,103 then the test must be targeting arbitration 
agreements. This characterization facilitated the Court’s use of a 
monocular lens—“When state law prohibits outright the arbitration 
of a particular type of claim, the analysis is straightforward: The 
conflicting rule is displaced by the FAA.”104 
Although the Court had already answered the issue to its 
satisfaction, it went on to note that the issue became “more complex” 
when a generally applicable doctrine, such as unconscionability, was 
applied in a “fashion that disfavors arbitration.”105 The Court then 
resurrected a footnote from Perry v. Thomas106 for the proposition 
that “a court may not ‘rely upon the uniqueness of an agreement to 
arbitrate as a basis for a state-law holding that enforcement would be 
unconscionable, for this would enable the court to effect what . . . the 
state legislature cannot.’”107 
As the Court had already described the Discover Bank rule as 
prohibiting “most collective-arbitration waivers in consumer 
 
 99. Id. (citing Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 690 (Cal. 
2000); accord Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1108 (Cal. 2005)). 
 100. Id. (citing Discover Bank, 113 P.3d at 1110). 
 101. Id. at 1745 (citing 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006)). 
 102. Id. at 1746. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. at 1747 (citing Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 353 (2008)). 
 105. Id. 
 106. 482 U.S. 483 (1987). 
 107. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1747 (citing Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492 n.9 (1987)). 
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contracts as unconscionable,”108 the next step in the Court’s analysis 
was an easy connection. When “[r]equiring the availability of 
classwide arbitration”109 eviscerates FAA objectives,110 the 
“conflicting rule is displaced by the FAA,”111 as states may not adopt 
their own, differing analysis.112 The Court then concluded that the 
Discover Bank rule was preempted because it “[stood] as an obstacle 
to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and 
objectives of Congress” in enacting the FAA,113 which the Court had 
defined as promoting the goals of arbitration.114 
2.  Justice Thomas’s  
Concurrence 
Justice Thomas reluctantly concurred in the judgment, but his 
reasoning was entirely different from that of the majority. Rather 
than finding, as did the majority, that the Discover Bank rule was a 
targeted attack on arbitration, Justice Thomas placed a narrow limit 
on the availability of FAA section 2 contract defenses. In his view, 
only successful challenges to the formation of an arbitration 
agreement should fall within the FAA exemption, a prerequisite that 
the Discover Bank rule did not impose.115 Justice Thomas concluded 
that the language of section 2 suggests that the FAA exemption 
covers only defenses capable of revoking a contract, not defenses 
related to invalidity or unenforceability.116 Although prior 
jurisprudence tended to use the concepts of invalidity, revocation, 
and unenforceability interchangeably, that was incorrect, according 
to Justice Thomas. 
 
 108. Id. at 1746. 
 109. Id. at 1748. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 1747 (citing Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U. S. 346, 353 (2008)). 
 112. Id. at 1747–48. 
 113. Id. at 1753 (citing Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)). 
 114. Id. at 1749. 
 115. Id. at 1753 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thomas cited that fraud or duress were such 
examples. Id. The Concepcions alleged fraud in the class action. Justice Thomas acknowledged 
that this was not an issue “fully developed by any party . . . and could benefit from briefing and 
argument in an appropriate case.” Id. at 1754. 
 116. Id. at 1753–54 (applying the statutory interpretation rules articulated in Duncan v. 
Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001), and Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997), to 
the language of section 2 where the enforcement phase refers to validity, revocation, and 
enforceability while the exemption references only revocation). 
  
456 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:435 
Under Justice Thomas’s interpretation, a court must order 
arbitration if there is no issue with respect to the making or 
formatting of the agreement for arbitration and “defenses unrelated 
to the making of the agreement—such as public policy—could not be 
the basis of declining to enforce an arbitration clause.”117 Justice 
Thomas recognized only fraud, undue influence, mutual mistake, 
duress, and delusion as likely available defenses.118 Noticeably 
missing is unconscionability, which is probably because of its 
substantive unconscionability component. Procedural 
unconscionability deals with the formation of a contract; substantive 
unconscionability focuses instead on the fairness of the provisions.119 
The Discover Bank rule, Justice Thomas noted, did not relate 
exclusively to formation of an agreement120 but rather to exculpatory 
contractual terms contrary to public policy. Under the Thomas 
interpretation of section 2, these were not grounds for revoking the 
contract.121 
3.  Justice Breyer’s  
Dissent 
Justice Breyer challenged the majority and concurring opinions 
in their entireties. First, Justice Breyer and his fellow dissenters 
viewed the Discover Bank rule not as an obstacle to section 2 of the 
FAA but as a means to further its purposes.122 The rule not only 
applied equally to class arbitration and class litigation alike123—
thereby not disfavoring or targeting arbitration agreements as a 
dispute resolution mechanism124—but also was in keeping with the 
basic purpose of the FAA “to make valid and enforceable 
agreements for arbitration.”125 
 
 117. Id. at 1755. 
 118. Id. at 1754–56. 
 119. See id. at 1746 (majority opinion). 
 120. Id. at 1753 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 121. However, the California law upon which the Discover Bank rule is founded does 
embrace contract formation as a requirement; there is nothing in the Discover Bank opinion to 
suggest that the court intended to eliminate it. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1670.5(a) (West 2011). 
 122. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1759–60 (Breyer, J. dissenting). 
 123. Id. at 1757. 
 124. Id. at 1759–60 (noting that the “Discover Bank rule imposes equivalent limitations on 
litigation” and therefore cannot violate the rule against targeting arbitration per se). 
 125. Id. at 1757 (quoting Marine Transit Corp. v. Dreyfus, 284 U.S. 263, 274 n.2 (1932)). 
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Next, Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, Kagan, and Ginsburg found, 
without support, that the majority’s contention that class arbitration 
was inconsistent with arbitration was a tool.126 They challenged any 
suggestion that class arbitration was without merit127 and highlighted 
its advantages, especially for small claims that offer little economic 
incentive to pursue individually.128 The dissent found the majority’s 
comparison of class arbitration to individual arbitration inapplicable 
and suggested the appropriate comparison was to judicial class 
proceedings.129 Finally, the dissenting Justices found no precedent 
for the majority’s striking down of a “state statute that treats 
arbitrations on par with judicial and administrative proceedings,”130 
especially in a way that interfered with the role of states with respect 
to arbitration agreements and contractual defenses that Congress 
preserved in the FAA.131 
At the heart of these differences with the majority was the 
dissent’s more neutral view of the FAA’s purpose.132 The dissenting 
Justices defined the purpose of the FAA as to enforce arbitration 
agreements just like other contracts, not to promote the expeditious 
resolution of claims through arbitration or to prefer arbitration 
agreements over other forms of contracts.133 The dissenting Justices 
would have preserved the application of the traditional 
unconscionability rule, understanding that only some class arbitration 
waivers will fall below the standard set by the Discover Bank rule.134 
C.  Analysis 
The majority in Concepcion dropped its call in several key 
respects. First, the Court side stepped the essence of the Discover 
Bank rule and applied its own myopic interpretation in order to 
achieve its desired result: enforcing the class arbitration waiver. In so 
doing, the Court failed to address adequately whether, through the 
FAA, Congress intended to allow such defenses as fraud and 
 
 126. Id. at 1758. 
 127. Id. at 1758–62. 
 128. Id. at 1761. 
 129. Id. at 1759. 
 130. Id. at 1761. 
 131. Id. at 1761–62. 
 132. See id. at 1756. 
 133. Id. at 1757–58. 
 134. Id. at 1757. 
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unconscionability to block enforcement of an arbitration agreement. 
Further, the Court did not acknowledge a state’s power to define 
unconscionability. Finally, it inadequately framed the purpose of the 
FAA as “promoting arbitration” and embarked on a dissertation on 
the benefits of arbitration, with at least two critical repercussions. 
Therefore, it failed to acknowledge the extent to which class 
arbitration is consistent with the terms and spirit of the FAA. And 
despite professing to be merely “plac[ing] arbitration agreements on 
an equal footing with other contracts,”135 the Court actually tipped 
the scales in favor of enforcing arbitration contracts over all others. 
As a result, Concepcion undercuts the purposes of the FAA and 
effectively eliminates class arbitration as a means to collectively 
resolve consumer disputes. In so doing, it not only creates a 
deafening static that blocks out consumer and likely other concerns, 
but it also invites a congressional response. 
1.  The Letter and Spirit of the FAA  
and the Discover Bank Rule 
Congress enacted the FAA to counter judicial hostility to 
arbitration agreements136 and to ensure that private agreements to 
arbitrate “are enforced according to their terms.”137 While in keeping 
with these purposes, the Court, in holding that the FAA preempted 
California law, made sweeping presumptions in two primary 
respects. First, it characterized the Discover Bank rule as an 
impermissible blanket prohibition of most class arbitration waivers. 
In the same breath, the Court dismissed unconscionability, as 
reflected in Discover Bank and other similar state jurisprudence, as a 
ground the FAA recognized as rendering an arbitration agreement 
unenforceable. Second, the Court read into the adhesion contract at 
issue traditional principles of contract formation, such as negotiation, 
and used these as a basis for its reasoning. As applied to consumer 
adhesion agreements and unconscionability, the Court’s approach 
undermines the letter and spirit of the FAA and disregards well-
established contract principles surrounding agreements and fairness. 
 
 135. Id. at 1745 (majority opinion) (citing Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 
U.S. 440, 443 (2006)). 
 136. Id. For a discussion of the purposes and processes under the FAA, see McGill & Tracey, 
supra note 22, at 13–16. 
 137. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1748. 
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a.  Class arbitration and  
the Discover Bank rule 
To the extent that state laws target and discriminate against 
arbitration, they are inconsistent with the FAA and are overridden by 
it.138 On the other hand, to the extent that a state law does not block 
the enforceability of an arbitration agreement, the FAA does not 
preempt it “even if the law encumbers arbitration in other ways.”139 
Unfortunately, the Court adopted the view that the Discover Bank 
rule140 condemned “most collective arbitration waivers in consumer 
contracts as unconscionable”141 seemingly without examining 
whether the Discover Bank rule actually invalidated most consumer 
contracts. While application of the Discover Bank principles might 
indeed invalidate a class arbitration waiver, this result was far from a 
given. In reality, the rule was far from a sweeping ban targeting class 
arbitration. 
The Concepcion majority seemed determined to ignore that the 
Discover Bank rule applied to more than just arbitration agreements 
and only within certain parameters and circumstances. At the same 
time, it dogmatically refused to assess the circumstances of the case 
before it. To pass Discover Bank muster, a contract must be both 
procedurally and substantively unconscionable. In the former 
category, because of the superior bargaining position of one party 
and the opportunity of the other party to either adhere to or reject a 
contract, such contracts “of adhesion” are procedurally 
unconscionable.142 With respect to substantive unconscionability, the 
California Supreme Court explained that there is an oppressive or 
 
 138. See id. at 1758 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 139. Hiro N. Aragaki, Arbitration’s Suspect Status, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1233, 1243 (2011) 
(describing examples of laws that encumber arbitration, including procedural and ethical rules 
regarding arbitration and appeal provisions). 
 140. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1746. 
 141. Id. at 1746. 
 142. Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1108 (Cal. 2005). As the Discover 
Bank court observed, adhesion contracts typically are one sided, providing benefits or protections 
to the stronger party and not to the consumer. See id. at 1108–09. However, that court’s decision 
did not invalidate all adhesion contracts, including those with waivers of class arbitration. Id. at 
1109. As a result, those fall “within the FAA’s exception” permitting nonenforcement of 
arbitration agreements on grounds that would apply to any contract. Donald J. Friedman et al., 
United States: Supreme Court Holds That Consumer Arbitration Agreements Can Bar Class 
Action Relief, MONDAQ.COM (May 5, 2011), http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/ 
article.asp?articleid=131316&print=1. 
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“surprise” element.143 Such unfairness could render a “consumer 
contract[] of adhesion . . . unenforceable, whether the consumer is 
being asked to waive the right to class action litigation or the right to 
classwide arbitration.”144 The rule applied uniformly to arbitration, 
judicial, and administrative proceedings,145 and “equally to class 
action litigation waivers in contracts without arbitration agreements 
and to class arbitration waivers in contracts with such 
agreements.”146 As the rule did not target arbitration contracts, it fell 
directly within the FAA’s enforcement exceptions.147 
Without analysis, the U.S. Supreme Court declared the Discover 
Bank principles so sweeping as to invalidate the class action waiver 
in the case before it and indeed in all such waivers, perhaps 
indicating of a rush to judgment. As such, the Court’s decision in 
Concepcion was a missed opportunity for it to address 
unconscionability in the context of the FAA. Before the Court issued 
its decision in Concepcion, contracts in California that effectively 
insulated parties from liability while not per se unconscionable, 
could be deemed unconscionable.148 The Court’s elimination of such 
unconscionability defenses in California and elsewhere, at least 
where a contract contains an arbitration clause, is especially 
troublesome where the party with the superior bargaining power has 
“carried out a scheme to deliberately cheat large numbers of 
consumers out of individually small sums of money.”149 
Moreover, had the Court examined the AT&T contract at issue, 
it would have found significant support for an argument that the 
contract was not unconscionable. Indeed, the clause at issue had a 
good chance to pass such scrutiny. While it was an adhesion 
contract, the arbitration clause offered significant incentives for the 
 
 143. Discover Bank, 113 P.3d at 1108. 
 144. Id. at 1103; see Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1756 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 145. See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1757 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Discover Bank, 113 P.3d at 
1112. 
 146. Discover Bank, 113 P.3d at 1112; see Friedman et al., supra note 142. 
 147. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1757 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 148. Discover Bank, 113 P.3d at 1108. The Discover Bank court held that such may be the 
case under California law where the agreement at issue is an exculpatory contract; that is, the 
object of the contract clause is to directly or indirectly “exempt anyone from responsibility for his 
own fraud, or willful injury . . . or other violation of [the] law” against public policy. Id. (citing 
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1668 (West 2011)). 
 149. Id. at 1110. 
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consumer to pursue individual arbitration and substantial penalties 
against the company.150 
Further, an approach directed at examining more broadly 
whether contract defenses provided by state law met the exemption 
of the FAA for “grounds as exist at law or equity” would have 
offered meaningful guidance to courts, businesses, and practitioners. 
At the same time, it may have raised numerous questions about state 
law, even opening “a floodgate of future litigation” with respect to 
individual class arbitration waivers and whether they were 
unconscionable.151 If nothing else, the Concepcion decision was 
clear: class action waivers in consumer contracts are enforceable. 
b.  Adhesion arbitration waivers and the  
FAA’s negotiated agreement presumption 
Including a class action waiver in a modern-day adhesion 
contract raises an unconscionability “red flag” that Congress hardly 
could have anticipated when it adopted the FAA. From that 1925 
time frame and until computer use became common, as many may 
remember, the physical act of drafting and revising legal documents 
was no easy task. Now, in the twenty-first century, using carbon 
paper or Wite-Out would be ludicrous. In the past, disseminating 
contract amendments would have been by wheel, rail, or human 
delivery. Posting not only the contract itself but also changes and 
amendments through the Internet, may mean a party has never seen 
the provisions at issue. Nevertheless, the Concepcion Court turned a 
blind eye to the realities of today’s mass adhesion contracts and their 
lack of the attributes typically enjoyed in individually negotiated 
agreements. 
Consumer arbitration agreements lack the fundamental 
foundation of contractual arbitration that Congress likely anticipated: 
equal bargaining power152 and parties engaged in, and designing, 
 
 150. Terms of the clause included the waiver of AT&T attorney fees, the obligation of AT&T 
to pay for all costs of nonfrivolous claims, and a penalty of $7,500 plus double consumer 
attorney’s fees if the consumer is awarded an amount higher than AT&T’s last settlement offer. 
Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1744, 1753. 
 151. Jean R. Sternlight, Cert Granted in AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, TODAY’S 
WORKPLACE (May 26, 2010), http://www.todaysworkplace.org/2010/05/26/cert-granted-in-att-
mobility-v-concepcion. 
 152. As Justice Breyer wrote in the dissent, Congress very well may have meant to enforce 
arbitration among merchants with factual, not legal, disputes, “under the customs of their 
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their own dispute resolution process. However, while professing 
loyalty to the basic tenets of arbitration and its contractual roots, the 
majority opinion in Concepcion refused to acknowledge that the 
dynamics of consumer and business arbitration agreements differ 
markedly in key respects. A consumer adhesion contract, unlike a 
unique or business-to-business contract, involves no negotiating 
between the parties. Rather, it is presented to the consumer on a 
“take it or leave it” basis. The practice is so common that there is no 
real alternative for consumers in the marketplace. While certainly 
parties are responsible for contracts that they enter into, the lack of 
meaningful negotiation or choice shifts the dynamics considerably: if 
you want a cellular phone, you must waive arbitration.153 
Typically, consumers are unaware of any arbitration clause or, at 
best, are naïve about its implications. Consumers certainly are not 
conversant in negotiating arbitration processes. While the Court 
played up the advantages of negotiating,154 it is far-fetched to suggest 
that the Concepcions or other consumers of electronic equipment or 
other mass-produced, non-custom goods play a role in designing 
arbitration procedures.155 Bargaining and negotiating in such 
consumer agreements are relics of the past, and consumers have no 
opportunity to negotiate the terms of a contract. In this context, the 
Court, professing to honor the intentions of the parties, was 
incongruous. Consequently, though arbitration policy articulated in 
the FAA favors honoring parties’ expectations, in Concepcion the 
Supreme Court honored only AT&T’s expectations.156 Until courts 
and Congress come to terms with the fallacy of consumer consent, 
arbitration policy, as framed by the Concepcion majority, will remain 
out of step with the modern marketplace. 
 
industries, where the parties possessed roughly equivalent bargaining power.” Concepcion, 131 S. 
Ct. at 1759 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 153. See Aragaki, supra note 139, at 1261–62 & n.154. 
 154. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1751–52. For example, the Court noted that parties can design 
“efficient, streamlined procedures tailored to the type of dispute,” even specifying designating a 
specialist arbitrator and requiring protection of trade secrets. Id. at 1749. 
 155. This is especially true where, as here, the contract was amended to revise arbitration 
provisions, albeit favorable ones, after the parties initially agreed to the contract. Id. at 1744. 
 156. This is underscored by the Court’s incongruous denunciation of California law allowing 
consumers to demand arbitration after the fact, id. at 1748, 1750; here, the arbitration procedures 
were added to the contract more than three years after the parties entered into it, a move that was 
likely designed to meet the criteria articulated the previous year in Discover Bank. Id. at 1744. 
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2.  Class Arbitration: Viable, Meaningful,  
and in Keeping with FAA Purposes 
The evaluation of the drawbacks of class-wide arbitration in 
Concepcion
157 was not unlike comparing landlines to cell phones 
only in terms of mobility. In its analysis, the Court compared 
individual arbitration to class arbitration rather than weigh the utility 
of class arbitration head on. It addressed speed to disposition on the 
merits (and not other means of resolution such as settlement, 
withdrawal, or dismissal). It observed that bilateral (individual claim) 
arbitration is faster than arbitrating a class claim, citing the need to 
certify the class and how discovery is conducted,158 without 
examining issues with multiple individual claims. Its conclusion that 
individual, and not collective, arbitration is fundamental to the 
concept of arbitration159 is disappointing. The dissent’s comparison 
of class arbitration to class litigation, and not to individual bilateral 
arbitration, is more instructive.160 
Class arbitration, if agreed to by the parties,161 is in keeping with 
the letter and the spirit of the FAA,162 as well as “the use of 
arbitration.”163 While resolving an individual claim is certainly less 
time consuming and complex than completing a class claim is, the 
cumulative effort of resolving numerous, similarly situated 
individual claims can be enormous and reflect a comparable 
expenditure of time and money. Individual arbitrations also evoke 
the specter of different outcomes for essentially identical claims and 
have their own defects, especially when dealing with similarly 
situated claims.164 
Chief among arbitration’s benefits are party-designed “efficient, 
streamlined procedures tailored to the type of dispute.”165 While the 
majority opinion deemed these advantages lost with class arbitration, 
in so doing, the majority implicitly rejected its own observation that 
 
 157. Id. at 1750–53. 
 158. Id. at 1751. 
 159. Id. at 1759 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 160. Id. at 1751 n.7 (majority opinion). 
 161. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1775–76 (2010). 
 162. See Moritz & Fitch, supra note 55, at 271. 
 163. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1758 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 164. These drawbacks include inaccessibility by other claimants or the public to the claims 
and outcome, discovery issues, and correctness and review issues. See McGill & Tracey, supra 
note 22. 
 165. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1749. 
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the arbitration agreement itself could simplify procedures.166 After 
all, the American Arbitration Association deems “class arbitration to 
be ‘a fair, balanced and efficient means of resolving class 
disputes.’”167 
Certainly, class arbitration is not without its drawbacks for 
businesses and consumers. For both, it is likely more time consuming 
and complex than resolving an individual claim is.168 For businesses, 
it is much more expensive and perilous. Class arbitration “greatly 
increases risks,” and the prospect of a massive judgment is more than 
daunting for organizations.169 For consumers, it presents a potential 
of attorney/client disparate interests with respect to settlement.170 
However, the Court disingenuously distilled its assessment of class 
arbitration in Concepcion by comparing its characteristics to those of 
of individual arbitration. 
The dissent rounded out the portrayal of class arbitration. In its 
view, a class approach is consistent with arbitration’s fundamental 
attributes and offers speed, efficiency, and cost advantages over 
judicial class actions.171 
Certainly more structure is needed in class arbitration than in 
individually-brought arbitration.172 However, especially for 
consumer claims arising from adhesion contracts, a class approach 
can provide access to justice that may otherwise be foreclosed.173 A 
class approach also can help correct a power imbalance between 
business and consumers.174 Only the dissenting opinion, grasps the 
import of preserving the right to collective consumer redress in the 
modern reality of consumer contracts of adhesion. 
 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. at 1758 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Brief for AAA as Amicus Curiae in Support 
of Neither Party, Stolt-Nielsen S. A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010) (No. 08-
1198), 2009 WL 2896309, at *25). 
 168. Id. at 1750–51 (majority opinion) (referring to class issues such as certification, 
discovery, and notice); see Moritz & Fitch, supra note 55, at 266–67. 
 169. Id. at 1752. 
 170. Moritz & Fitch, supra note 55, at 267. 
 171. See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1759–61 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 172. Id. at 1751 (majority opinion) (explaining that fairly formal procedures are necessary in 
order to notify and bind absent class members, and to provide an opportunity for class members 
to be heard). 
 173. See id. at 1760–61 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 174. See id. at 1759. 
 
Winter 2012]       SEEKING A RATIONAL LAWYER 465 
3.  The Concepcion Decision’s Impact on  
Business, Consumers, and Dispute Resolution 
Concepcion’s eradication of the Discover Bank rule was only 
the tip of the iceberg. Early predictions that Concepcion would be a 
watershed event for contracts, arbitration, consumer protection,175 
and even employment arbitration176 were realized. “This is a game-
changer for businesses. It’s one of the most important and favorable 
cases for businesses in a very long time.”177 The decision will 
revitalize business interest in arbitration agreements and perhaps 
even unconscionable practices. It will also make it less likely that 
consumers will pursue small, yet valid, claims. 
a.  Business approach to arbitration  
agreements in consumer contracts 
Including waivers of class arbitration in consumer contracts is a 
widespread practice. One 2004 article reported that of fifty-two 
arbitration clauses in consumer contracts reviewed, 30.8 percent 
contained waivers of class actions.178 The Searle Civil Justice 
Institute, in a different study, found that 36.5 percent of arbitration 
clauses examined included a class action waiver.179 This percentage 
will only increase. Even “companies that calculated the pros and 
cons of arbitration and rejected arbitration may want to reevaluate 
their calculus and choose to require arbitration in their consumer 
 
 175. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Weighs Class-Action Suits, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 
10, 2010, at B3. Precluding class action would “gut the state’s substantive consumer protection 
law.” Id. (quoting Concepcion counsel Deepak Gupta in oral argument). On the other hand, 
allowing class claims would “sound a different sort of death knell . . . for the arbitration 
provisions that were common in many standard-form contracts.” Id. (paraphrasing AT&T counsel 
Andrew J. Pincus). 
 176. Sternlight, supra note 151. Sternlight predicted that a favorable ruling for AT&T 
particularly could affect wage and hour claims, typically accumulated in class actions. Id.; see 
Friedman et al., supra note 142 (“Although this was a consumer case, it could significantly 
impact the development and enforcement of pre-dispute arbitration programs in the employment 
context.”). 
 177. Liptak, supra note 12 (quoting Vanderbilt law professor Brian T. Fitzpatrick). 
 178. Aragaki, supra note 139, at 1261 (citing Linda J. Demaine & Deborah R. Hensler, 
“Volunteering” to Arbitrate Through Predispute Arbitration Clauses: The Average Consumer’s 
Experience, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring 2004, at 65). 
 179. Id. at 1261–62 (citing SEARLE CIVIL JUSTICE INST., CONSUMER ARBITRATION BEFORE 
THE AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION 103 (2009), available at http://www.adr.org/ 
si.asp?id=6610). Aragaki reports that this study found that while the use of class arbitration 
waivers varied with the industry, they appeared in 100 percent of the cellular telephone contracts 
surveyed. Id. at 1261 n.154. 
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agreements.”180 While class arbitrations may persist post-
Concepcion,181 businesses may be able to avoid class action by 
making simple changes in consumer contracts.182 The exception to 
this new possibility may be financial services companies, which 
“should consider the impact of possible rulemaking” by the 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau pursuant to the Dodd-Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Protection Act on their standard consumer 
contracts.183 
b.  Consumers and dispute resolution 
While counsel for AT&T heralded its win as “a victory for 
consumers,”184 that assessment should be confined to agreements 
that contain earmarks of fairness. Unfortunately, the pro-consumer 
provisions that were added to the AT&T-Concepcion contract are 
“highly unusual.”185 The availability of the unconscionability defense 
provided strong motivation for business to draft agreements fairly in 
the pre-Concepcion environment; that motivation does not exist in 
the post-Concepcion era. Consumers can look forward to unequal 
cost burdens, limited discovery, short limitation periods, and one-
sided application of the clause. The inability to aggregate claims in 
 
 180. Friedman et al., supra note 142.  
 181. With respect to labor-related arbitrations, the NLRB recently ruled that it is a “violation 
of federal labor law to require employees to sign arbitration agreements that prevent them from 
joining together to pursue employment-related legal claims in any forum, whether in arbitration 
or in court.” Board Finds That Certain Mandatory Arbitration Agreements Violate Federal Labor 
Law, NLRB (Jan. 6, 2012), http://www.nlrb.gov/news/board-finds-certain-mandatory-arbitration-
agreements-violate-federal-labor-law; see also Steven Greenhouse, Labor Board Supports Class 
Action for Workers, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2012, at B1 (describing the NLRB’s ruling that 
employers’ arbitration agreements cannot ban workers from pursuing collective or class action). 
With respect to whether class arbitrations persist generally, “[i]t remains to be seen whether, in 
practice, the Supreme Court’s holdings in Stolt-Nielsen and Concepcion sound a death-knell for 
class action arbitration in the United States.” SIMPSON THACHER & BARTLETT LLP, supra note 
19, at 3–4. 
 182. See Liptak, supra note 12 (quoting Vanderbilt law professor Brian T. Fitzpatrick); see 
also Sternlight, supra note 151 (anticipating that “[a] broad decision in favor of AT&T Mobility 
could potentially allow companies in a variety of contexts to insulate themselves from class 
action exposure by including class action waivers in their arbitration clauses.”). 
 183. The Impact of AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion on Financial Services Companies: 
Inclusion of Arbitration Clauses in Customer Contracts and the Impact of Dodd-Frank, 
SUTHERLAND ASBILL & BRENNAN LLP (May 24, 2011), http://www.sutherland.com/files/News/ 
0adf7d33-90b9-449b-a0d5-d95d5f228713/Presentation/NewsAttachment/7e906c35-c8c6-44ef-
8ac1-5d95b50221d6/TheImpactofATTMobilityvConcepcionMay2011.pdf. 
 184. Liptak, supra note 12. 
 185. Sternlight, supra note 151. 
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arbitration will be just one of the hurdles for consumers to clear in 
order for arbitration to be a viable avenue of dispute resolution. 
i.  Efficacy of individual versus  
collective consumer dispute resolution 
It is unlikely that companies with arbitration contracts will hear 
complaints of consumers with the same clarity as they did before 
Concepcion. After all, such waivers of class action in a consumer 
contract, whether through litigation or arbitration, eliminate a 
meaningful vehicle for consumers to seek redress for like grievances 
collectively. The Discover Bank court evoked the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s decision in Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor in this regard: 
The policy at the very core of the class action mechanism is 
to overcome the problem that small recoveries do not 
provide the incentive for any individual to bring a solo 
action prosecuting his or her rights. A class action solves 
this problem by aggregating the relatively paltry potential 
recoveries into something worth someone’s (usually an 
attorney’s) labor.186 
On the other hand, the aggregation of even small claims, when 
multiplied by as many as tens to hundreds of thousands of plaintiffs 
or more, can have a powerful impact on business. This, too, was a 
theme in the Court’s consideration of class power in its October 2010 
term. For instance, in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes,187 the Court 
blocked class certification of the employment discrimination claims 
of 1.5 million plaintiffs seeking class certification.188 Had the Court 
 
 186. Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1105–06 (Cal. 2005) (quoting 
Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997)); see Leitner & Goode, supra note 
55, at 166–67 (“Congress found in its 2005 enactment of the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA) 
that class actions ‘are an important and valuable part of the legal system when they permit the fair 
and efficient resolution of legitimate claims of numerous parties.’”). In this vein, the court in 
Discover Bank also noted: 
The potential for millions of customers to be overcharged small amounts without an 
effective method of redress cannot be ignored. Therefore, the provision violates 
fundamental notions of fairness. . . . This is not only substantively unconscionable, it 
violates public policy by granting Discover a “get out of jail free” card while 
compromising important consumer rights. 
Discover Bank, 113 P.3d. at 1108 (alteration in original) (citing Szetela v. Discover Bank, 118 
Cal. Rptr. 2d 862, 868 (Ct. App. 2002)). Ironically, the class action waiver in Concepcion may 
very well have been valid under Discover Bank principles, but was not addressed by the Court. 
 187. 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011). 
 188. Id. at 2547, 2561. 
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affirmed class certification, the potential collective impact of their 
claims would have enhanced the plaintiffs’ bargaining position 
astronomically. In Concepcion, in assessing the risks of class actions 
for defendants, the Court referred to “in terrorem” settlements “[b]ut 
when damages allegedly owed to tens of thousands of potential 
claimants are aggregated and decided at once, the risk of an error 
will often become unacceptable. Faced with even a small chance of a 
devastating loss, defendants will be pressured into settling 
questionable claims.”189 This is especially troublesome when the 
claims lack substance or merit. 
While undoubtedly class actions have a dark side, or at least 
negative side-effects that businesses want to avoid, they provide an 
avenue for consumers to pursue claims they otherwise would not file. 
There is little incentive for consumers to file a claim when the 
amount in controversy is small; only if claims are aggregated is there 
any meaningful remedy and deterrent. This is a “huge deal in the 
world of consumer litigations, as many consumer challenges are only 
brought through class actions.”190 Arguably, the AT&T arbitration 
process was “free, fair, fast, easy to use and consumer friendly,” as 
its counsel described it.191 However, even when this is the case, the 
inherent drawback of pursuing small claims individually creates a 
disincentive to proceed. Consumers will be even more discouraged 
from proceeding with arbitration if businesses view the Concepcion 
decision as an opportunity to revise contract arbitration processes to 
provide fewer safeguards for customers. 
ii.  Arbitration and unconscionable practices 
In addition to discouraging the pursuit of legitimate claims, 
curtailing the availability of the class action arbitration vehicle 
effectively insulates companies that perpetrate poor practices or even 
downright fraudulent schemes. As the Discover Bank court noted: 
The potential for millions of customers to be overcharged 
small amounts without an effective method of redress 
 
 189. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1752 (2011). 
 190. Sternlight, supra note 151 (discussing this fact under an assumption that the Court would 
render “a broad decision in favor of AT&T,” as turned out to be the case). Sternlight further noted 
that “[s]uch a ruling could also affect employment cases, particularly wage and hour claims, 
which are typically presented in class actions.” Id. 
 191. Liptak, supra note 12. 
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cannot be ignored. Therefore, the provision violates 
fundamental notions of fairness. . . . This is not only 
substantively unconscionable, it violates public policy by 
granting Discover a “get out of jail free” card while 
compromising important consumer rights.192 
Unethical practices with respect to consumers and arbitration 
agreements may increase post-Concepcion. Before the decision was 
issued, one study showed that 68.5 percent of all unconscionability 
cases over two years involved arbitration agreements, many times 
more than reported two decades ago.193 During the same period, of 
the arbitration agreements courts examined, 50.3 percent were 
deemed unconscionable.194 The result of Concepcion may be to “gut 
the state’s substantive consumer protection law because people will, 
in the context of small frauds, not be able to bring those cases,”195 a 
concern echoed by Justice Breyer in the dissenting opinion.196 With 
state laws policing unconscionability preempted by the FAA, there is 
good reason to believe that Concepcion will open the door to even 
more problems for consumers. 
IV.  A CALL  
FOR ACTION 
The Concepcion Court emphasized the FAA’s provisions 
requiring enforcement of arbitration agreements including waiver 
agreements, as they are written. This certainly was consistent with 
the FAA’s purpose to countermand a perceived judicial hostility to 
arbitration.197 However, it was never intended to promote arbitration 
over other dispute resolution mechanisms. To this end, from its 
inception, the FAA policy protecting contractually agreed-on 
arbitration was not without qualification; it explicitly preserves 
defenses capable of invalidating a contract in whole or in part. The 
Court glossed over these provisions and remained unimpressed by 
the respective lack of bargaining power or consent inherent in 
 
 192. Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1108 (Cal. 2005) (quoting Szetela v. 
Discover Bank, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 862, 868 (Ct. App. 2002)). 
 193. Aragaki, supra note 139, at 1286. 
 194. Id. 
 195. Transcript of Oral Argument at 51, AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 
(2011) (No. 09-893) (quoting Concepcion counsel Deepak Gupta in oral argument). 
 196. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1756 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 197. Id. at 1745 (majority opinion). 
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adhesion contracts. It was similarly unmoved by possible fraud 
schemes in the formation or application of a contract. The Court’s 
approach should clearly speak to congressional ears: act now. While 
it is beyond the scope of this Article to prescribe the full text of a 
consumer arbitration legislative model,198 a few recommendations 
must be made. 
A.  Contract Defenses  
at Law or Equity 
That Congress preserved in section 2 of the FAA legal and 
equitable grounds capable of defeating an arbitration clause reflects 
Congress’s original purpose to set boundaries around the 
enforcement of arbitration agreements.199 The language of section 2 
limiting the enforcement of arbitration agreements (“save upon such 
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any 
contract”) reflects congressional intent to retain an important role for 
states with respect to arbitration agreements,200 unless the defenses 
are those only applying to arbitration or arbitration agreements.201 
Unfortunately, courts have downplayed the importance of this 
express limitation even while they have proclaimed allegiance to 
congressional intent. Although existing FAA exemptions should 
have been sufficient to shelter the criteria for unconscionability 
addressed by the Discover Bank rule, given the Concepcion ruling it 
is now incumbent upon Congress to act again to reinforce FAA 
consumer protections in a clear and unmistakable way, which at the 
same time would preserve the state role with respect to contracts. 
In addition, Congress needs to clarify whether indeed defenses 
available at law and equity must only relate to the formation of the 
contract at issue. Ironically, both the Discover Bank rule and Justice 
Thomas’s concurring rationale for meeting the FAA exemption 
emphasize that defenses asserted must arise from contract formation. 
While Discover Bank does not require fraud in the inducement and 
considers fraud in the substantive assessment of the impact of the 
 
 198. For comprehensive recommendation of such a model, see McGill, supra note 47, at 390–
412. 
 199. See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1754–55 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 200. Id. at 1756 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 201. Id. at 1746 (majority opinion). For a discussion of state law with respect to 
unconscionable contracts and the FAA, see Moritz & Fitch, supra note 55, at 269, 277–78. 
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particular contract clause, Justice Thomas would only recognize a 
defense that relates to the formation of the contract. Implicit in his 
reasoning is the conclusion that Congress never intended to preserve 
substantive unconscionability as an available defense.202 No matter 
how unfair the impact of the clause, only irregularities in its 
formation will defeat it. The recurrent flaw in this position, or 
perhaps in the FAA language itself, is that contract formation was 
markedly different in 1925 when Congress enacted the FAA. Online 
arbitration clauses drafted solely by one party and added to the 
contract after its formation could not have been within the 
contemplation of the drafters, not to mention such changes occurring 
in cyberspace. 
B.  Consumers, Arbitration,  
and Class Action 
Previous legislative attempts203 to contain mandatory consumer 
and other arbitration, dubbed as attempts to “shrink the FAA’s 
preemptive shadow,”204 have died on the table.205 But public reaction 
to the sweeping Concepcion decision has been swift, loud, and 
harsh;206 as a result, renewed legislative efforts to exempt consumer 
and employment disputes from the application of the policy in favor 
of arbitration are well underway.207 The Arbitration Fairness Act of 
2011 (“AFA 2011”) was introduced in Congress on May 12, 2011, 
 
 202. See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1753 (Thomas, J., concurring). This position was not fully 
argued or developed by the parties. Id. at 1754. Defects relating to the formation of a contract 
eliminate policy considerations surrounding the unfair, harsh, or surprising impact of a clause—
important aspects of the Discover Bank rule. Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 
1108 (Cal. 2005). 
 203. See Aragaki, supra note 139, at 1272 n.214 for a listing of several legislative proposals 
made in 2009 alone. 
 204. Id. at 1272. 
 205. See Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, H.R. 1020, 111th Cong. (2009); Arbitration 
Fairness Act of 2007, H.R. 3010, 110th Cong. (2007); S. 1782, 110th Cong. (2007). 
 206. See, e.g., Gutting Class Action: The Five Conservatives of the Supreme Court Chose 
Corporations over Everyone Else, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 2011, at A26. The opinion piece 
describes the AFA 2011 as “a welcome effort to protect consumers, employees and others.” Id. 
 207. Senators Al Franken (D-Minn.) and Richard Blumenthal (D-Conn.) and Representative 
Hank Johnson (D-Ga.) announced the reintroduction of the Arbitration Fairness Act in a press 
release on May 17, 2011. See Sens. Franken, Blumenthal, Rep. Hank Johnson Introduce 
Legislation to Protect Legal Rights of Consumers, AL FRANKEN U.S. SENATOR FOR MINN. 
(May 17, 2011), http://franken.senate.gov/?p=press_release&id=1514. 
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and referred to committee.208 As did its 2009 predecessor,209 the 
AFA 2011 proposes the invalidation of pre-dispute consumer 
arbitration agreements and vests a court with subject-matter 
jurisdiction over questions of validity and scope.210 However, the bill 
remains silent as to the fate of class action or class arbitration 
waivers and does not apply retroactively.211 An approach that would 
permit a case-by-case determination of whether state law was in 
conflict with the FAA,212 and one that would also examine 
substantive unconscionability (as opposed to coercion in the 
formation of an adhesion contract), should also be considered.213 
At this juncture, more comprehensive and consumer-specific 
congressional action is needed. The AFA 2011 goes beyond 
consumer contracts and also purports to restrict arbitration of 
employment and civil rights disputes. Although employment and 
civil rights disputes share many of the same power imbalances that 
consumers face, combining these broad categories into a one-size-
fits-all solution denies the opportunity to focus on the unique issues 
each presents. The omnibus approach also slows the approval 
process and increases the chances that support may be fragmented.214 
Specific legislation separately addressing the employment, civil 
rights,215 and consumer contexts would be preferable. 
 
 208. H.R. 1873, 112th Cong. (2011); S. 987, 112th Cong. (2011). The 2011 bills do not refer 
to franchise disputes as the 2009 versions did and now refer to civil rights disputes specifically. 
Compare S. 987 § 3 (referring to civil rights disputes but not franchise disputes), and H.R. 1873 
§ 3 (referring to civil rights disputes but not franchise disputes), with H.R. 1020, 111th Cong. § 3 
(2009) (referring to franchise disputes), and S. 931, 111th Cong. § 3 (2009) (referring to franchise 
disputes). 
 209. H.R. 1020 § 4. 
 210. H.R. 1873 § 3. 
 211. H.R. 1873 § 4; S. 987 § 4 (“This Act, and the amendments made by this Act, shall take 
effect on the date of enactment of this Act and shall apply with respect to any dispute or claim 
that arises on or after such date.”). 
 212. See Aragaki’s discussion of a more refined approach to a preemption analysis, supra 
note 139, at 1280–81. 
 213. See id. (advancing a pre-Concepcion discussion of this model). 
 214. The Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009 pooled consumer, employment, and franchise 
disputes into one bill. H.R. 1020 § 4. The 2011 incarnation drops franchise disputes and includes 
civil rights disputes and even some labor statutory rights. H.R. 1873 § 3. Categories that did not 
proceed through the hearings that were held in the fall of 2009 will undoubtedly slow the hearing 
process for the new bill. See Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, H.R. 1020, 111th Cong. (2009). 
 215. This is needed as a result of 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456 (2009), in 
which the Court found that a collective bargaining agreement waived an individual bargaining 
unit member’s right to pursue a statutory discrimination claim in court. For a discussion of 
proposed legislation protecting a collective bargaining union member’s statutory discrimination 
claims, see McGill & Tracey, supra note 22, at 64–68. 
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An effective approach must preserve collective redress in either 
the judicial or arbitral forum or both. This is noticeably absent from 
the proposed AFA 2011 legislation. Congress should invalidate 
waivers of collective consumer action along with pre-dispute 
arbitration agreements. 
C.  Retroactivity 
Other crucial consumer issues remain unresolved by the AFA 
2011. Given the continuing nature of many consumer contracts, 
retroactive application is essential. Many consumers will be 
functioning under cell phone and credit card agreements entered into 
years ago; preexisting arbitration clauses should not be allowed to 
defeat congressional intent. Further, one-sided amendment rights, 
allowing a business to change the rules in the middle of a contract 
period, should not be applicable to dispute resolution. The proposed 
bill contemplates application to “disputes” arising after the AFA 
2011 comes into force, so there is room to argue that the bill covers 
all new disputes regardless of the timing of an agreement. Still, many 
disputes will be continuous or will straddle the effective date. Clearer 
retroactivity is required. 
D.  Consumer Disputes  
Defined 
The AFA 2011 provides a very narrow definition of a consumer 
dispute, as a dispute that relates to property acquired for personal, 
family, or household purposes.216 Missing is the word “primarily,” 
which appeared in the 2009 bill. Many consumers purchase mixed-
use goods, such as computers and cell phones, that they use for both 
work and home application. Disputes relating to these products 
appear to not be covered by the proposed legislation. Finally, the 
AFA 2011 does not regulate post-dispute arbitration agreements in 
any way. The principles of unconscionability should apply to these 
agreements and clarification is necessary in the post-Concepcion 
world. 
 
 216. H.R. 1873 § 3. 
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E.  Unconscionability 
It could be argued that the arbitration clause in Concepcion, 
when taken in its entirety, was not overly unfair to the consumer. It 
applied to both AT&T and the consumer, preserved the small-claims-
court forum, and imposed penalties on AT&T for lowball offers; it is 
more balanced than many of its predecessors.217 But the pre-
Concepcion application of unconscionability must be credited for 
bringing a sense of fair play to the drafting of these clauses. 
Congress must preserve a comparable inducement to ensure that 
those drafting post-dispute agreements have the same incentive to be 
fair. 
Even where contracts contain arguably “fair” class arbitration 
waivers, the concerns articulated in Discover Bank with respect to 
unconscionable contracts are far from resolved. For instance, 
preserving a small-claims-court forum for individual claims, as the 
AT&T clause did, inadequately addresses issues common to large 
groups of consumers, such as improper fees, service charges, time of 
crediting payments, or, in the Concepcions’ case, whether the phone 
they received was “free.” Without the notice feature of a class action, 
consumers may be unaware of the potential problem. In addition, 
requiring each consumer to bring a small claims or other individual 
action provides no deterrence to companies that engage in sloppy or 
illegal practices.218 Further, the Court’s foray into state law defining 
and confining unconscionability leaves many questions unanswered 
with respect to whether and to what extent states can regulate unfair 
practices, or even fraud, when the specter of arbitration looms.219 
Congress should amend the FAA explicitly to allow for the 
exemptions under the terms provided by the Discover Bank rule or to 
allow other substantive standards of fairness, such as mutual 
application of the choice of forum and cost protection for 
 
 217. See, e.g., Seidel v. TELUS Commc’ns, Inc., [2011] 1 S.C.R. 531, 25, 46 (Can.) (finding 
that where unconscionability was not available to defeat arbitration clauses, the TELUS clause 
applied only to consumers, not businesses; had no cost protection; and removed small claims 
court as an option). 
 218. See Sternlight, supra note 151 (stating that a possible rationale for such class actions is 
to deter companies from behaving fraudulently). 
 219. “ATT Mobility LLC did not entirely block courts from rejecting arbitration provisions as 
unconscionable.” Friedman et al., supra note 142, at 3. 
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consumers.220 Congress should also improve procedural fairness by 
requiring mandatory disclosure of terms, incorporating cancellation 
rights, and articulating base line arbitration safeguards.221 At the 
same time, businesses should take responsibility for ensuring fair 
contract provisions in these respects. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The Discover Bank rule and other similar jurisprudence 
precluding enforcement of contractual provisions that are 
substantively and procedurally unconscionable fell by the wayside in 
Concepcion, at least with respect to class action arbitration waivers. 
The majority’s flawed view, that it should promote the goals of 
arbitration rather than interpret the limits of arbitration policy 
established by the FAA, set it on a course that disregarded the 
realities of the consumer market. Unfortunately, the ruling reverses 
gains made toward protecting consumers in adhesion agreements, 
such as those protections embodied in decisions like Discover Bank. 
The repercussions of Concepcion go much further than 
validating class arbitration waivers: the decision virtually eliminates 
the unconscionability defense from the FAA exemption. In an effort 
to prevent manipulation of unconscionability to perpetuate judicial 
bias against arbitration, the Concepcion majority dogmatically 
ignored the abuse delivered to consumers by one-sided and unfair 
arbitration clauses in which they had no input. 
By restricting a court’s ability to examine the specific aspects of 
a particular arbitration clause and to consider them when assessing 
the substantive unconscionability of a clause, the Court gave carte 
blanche to businesses seeking to insulate themselves from consumer 
complaints. So devout was the majority’s allegiance to the policy in 
favor of arbitration that it overrode Congress’s intent and completely 
removed unconscionability as an available ground for revoking an 
arbitration clause in any circumstance. 
 
 220. EDWARD BRUNET ET AL., ARBITRATION LAW IN AMERICA: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT, 
181, 375–76 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2006); McGill, supra note 47, at 390–412. 
 221. The FAA does not address arbitration processes; this is left to the agreement of the 
parties. Compare McGill & Tracey, supra note 22, at 13–16 (commenting on the FAA’s failure to 
discuss arbitration processes), with the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 
(2006) (failing also to discuss arbitration processes). 
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At this juncture, consumer-focused congressional action is 
necessary to protect consumers and to restore to them meaningful 
contractual bargaining power and remedies. A more balanced 
approach to the purposes of the FAA is needed; the legislation must 
be a vehicle to secure the enforcement of arbitration agreements, 
subject to legal and equitable defenses, and not merely a directive to 
promote the underlying objectives of arbitration. Congress must tip 
the scales of justice so that, as the Court before Concepcion said 
repeatedly, courts treat arbitration agreements “like all other 
contracts.”222 
 
 
 222. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1761 (2011) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting) (citing Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 447 (2006)). 
